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BOOK REvIEWS
IS PROFESSIONaL MILITaRY EDuCaTION NECESSaRY?
ricks, thomas e. The generals: american Military command from world war ii to Today. New 
york: Penguin, 2012. 576pp. $32.95
tom ricks has earned over the past 
two decades a justified reputation as a 
thorough and knowledgeable military 
correspondent. His latest work ad-
dresses the decline in the competence 
of generals in the U.s. army, which he 
regards as a major and timely issue. as 
is to be expected from such a thought-
ful journalist, ricks has produced an 
important book that should spark debate 
and discussion not only among the 
army’s leaders but also among those of 
the other services. The generals is well 
written and at times insightful. Indeed, 
it makes a plausible case that there is 
something flawed in the choice and 
education of army leaders. for that 
reason alone it deserves close attention 
from those responsible for the shaping 
and course of service personnel policies 
that guide the preparation and promo-
tion of america’s future military leaders.
Nevertheless, there are serious weak-
nesses in ricks’s examination. admit-
tedly, he has provided an excellent 
catalogue of the symptoms that indicate 
the decline in quality of army gener-
als from george Marshall to tommy 
franks. However, in the end, ricks’s 
account fails to address systemic factors 
that lie behind that decline. thus at few 
points does he draw out the underlying 
landscape of causality and accident, the 
impact of chance on events, the other 
possibilities open to army leaders of 
the past, or the impact of trends and 
political choices on the army’s lead-
ership. Moreover, he fails to address 
the elusive but essential problem of 
changes in the army’s culture over 
time, or how and why those changes 
came about. yet from this military 
historian’s point of view, that last issue 
represents the crucial element in the 
effectiveness of military institutions.
What this review aims to suggest is 
some of the larger areas that do not 
form a part of ricks’s account, such as 
the problem of unexpected changes in 
the underlying culture of the army; 
the problem of unintended effects in 
personnel decisions and overall policy; 
the often baleful choices that political 
leaders have imposed on the army; the 
importance of understanding the conti-
nuity of events in examining the leaders 
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who reach the senior levels; and above 
all, the intellectual framework within 
which that leadership has developed.
the difficulty with developing military 
leaders to which ricks alludes is that 
the military profession demands two 
different attributes in its leaders, at-
tributes that flow from the very nature 
of the profession. as Michael Howard 
so brilliantly suggested in an address at 
the royal United services Institute in 
the early 1970s, the military represents 
a profession that, fortunately, rarely 
gets to practice the fundamental reason 
for its existence—namely, the conduct 
of wars. that reality in turn makes the 
leadership of military forces not only 
the most physically demanding of all 
the professions but the most demand-
ing intellectually. the mere running of 
military forces in peacetime, particularly 
after the second World War, has become 
such a complex task that its leaders can 
all too easily lose sight of the reason 
why their organizations exist. Moreover, 
over the course of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries military institu-
tions have confronted the considerable 
problems that rapid changes in technol-
ogy bring in their wake. How then are 
military leaders to address a world in 
constant flux, with its massive social and 
technological changes? Most impor-
tantly, they cannot replicate the horrors 
and complexities of the battlefield on 
which their soldiers, marines, sailors, 
and airmen will fight. that conundrum 
represents the heart of peacetime in-
novation, on which the combat effective-
ness of military institutions depends.
let us begin with george C. Marshall, 
whom ricks has quite rightly selected 
as the paradigm by which those who 
aspire to high command should model 
their careers (but more often do not). 
the problem with selecting Marshall, 
however, is that he was an anomaly 
in the officer corps. significantly, and 
reflective of the weaknesses in his analy-
sis, ricks omits to discuss Marshall’s 
seminal role as the deputy commandant 
of the army’s Infantry school, at fort 
benning, in the 1930s. In that post the 
army’s future chief of staff emphasized 
the education of the faculty as well as of 
the students. If he kept a “black book” in 
which he recorded the most outstanding, 
as well as the least capable, of the officers 
with whom he came in contact, it was 
at fort benning. there he could, and 
undoubtedly did, observe a considerable 
number of officers who passed through 
that institution as either faculty mem-
bers or students and who would eventu-
ally lead the U.s. army in World War II. 
In the midst of the rush to mobilize a 
grossly unprepared institution to meet 
the desperate situation of 1940, Mar-
shall’s emphasis on education remained 
steadfast. significantly, with the world 
going to hell in a handbasket in June 
1940, two out of the six faculty mem-
bers of the army War College at fort 
McNair were Colonel W. H. simpson 
and Major J. lawton Collins. In today’s 
military an assignment as instructor to 
a war college during a major crisis is a 
sure sign of the end of a career. Not so in 
Marshall’s army. simpson would become 
a lieutenant general by 1944 and com-
mand the Ninth army in the european 
theater of operations, while Collins 
would be a division commander by 1942 
on guadalcanal, a corps commander 
in europe by 1944, later an army chief 
of staff, and in the postwar period the 
army’s chief of staff. yet both remained 
in their faculty positions for the remain-
der of the 1940–41 academic year. that 
is perhaps where the greatest difference 
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lies between the culture of today’s 
military and the attitude of Marshall.
ricks is quite right to underline the 
ruthlessness with which Marshall and 
his senior subordinates fired those who 
failed to measure up to the demands of 
war. He is, however, on shakier ground 
in suggesting that they were willing to 
give those who failed a second chance. 
In fact, such cases were quite rare. 
Moreover, it is at the more junior levels 
(major and below) where one might 
consider a few second chances. In that 
respect, it is worth noting that Major 
Jack galvin was one of the junior of-
ficers who felt general William dePuy’s 
wrath during the vietnam War and 
was fired. Nevertheless, in the army of 
the 1970s, his career recovered, and he 
eventually reached the post of supreme 
allied Commander, europe. In terms 
of World War II, the generals, for the 
most part, who were removed from 
command disappeared into retirement 
or into commands stateside as colonels. 
those who did not were the exceptions. 
Marshall and his subordinates were 
able to purge those whom they believed 
incompetent because the United states 
faced a challenge to its existence. Con-
fronting that reality as well, the media 
were hardly willing to complain about 
the firing of incompetent officers from 
senior command positions. thus it may 
be a stretch to point to command poli-
cies in a time of national emergency as a 
pattern worth following in the present. 
a great weakness in ricks’s account 
lies in his failure to address the impor-
tance of professional military educa-
tion (PMe) to create a culture that can 
innovate in peacetime and adapt to the 
unexpected conditions of combat. the 
historical rec ord of the interwar period 
suggests that the schoolhouse provided 
the basis for the strategic and operation-
al framework within which america’s 
military forces conducted and won the 
great campaigns of a two-front war, one 
that saw the projection of U.s. power 
across the Pacific and atlantic oceans. 
one of the possible explanations for the 
prewar emphasis on PMe lies in the fact 
that without any significant resources 
in those years, the U.s. military had no 
choice but to devote much of its energy 
to serious study. on the other hand, it 
is also clear that many officers in that 
military believed that as members of a 
serious profession, they needed to study 
their profession just as lawyers and doc-
tors do. on the Navy side of the house, it 
is significant that one of the most inno-
vative CINCUss (Commanders in Chief, 
United states), admiral Joseph reeves, 
spent a tour on the faculty at the Naval 
War College, in Newport, rhode Island, 
while the future admiral raymond spru-
ance, the great leader of the Central Pa-
cific drive, spent two tours on its faculty.
at the end of World War II, many of 
the returning generals and admirals 
who had led U.s. forces identified the 
staff and war colleges as having played 
major roles in preparing them for the 
arduous tasks they had just confronted. 
eisenhower, as the army’s chief of staff, 
went so far as to take a major part in the 
founding of the National War College. 
However, almost immediately the staff 
and war colleges declined in importance, 
until by the sixties they represented 
refuges in which both faculty and stu-
dents could search for postretirement 
jobs or play golf. thus the instruments 
for the study of the military profession 
never really recovered the influence 
they had possessed before the war.
there are a number of possible explana-
tions. this reviewer favors two. first, 
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the pressures of the Cold War and the 
conduct of major wars in Korea and 
vietnam led senior leaders to devalue 
education in favor of readiness. second, 
but equally important, was the fact that 
the generation of leaders that assumed 
control of the american military in 
the early sixties had risen rapidly to 
command positions in the massive 
mobilization of World War II. like 
Westmoreland—who refused a potential 
assignment to the army War College 
with the comment that he was too 
advanced to be a student but was willing 
to serve as a faculty member—many of-
ficers dismissed the idea of serious study 
of their profession, having “learned” ev-
erything they needed to know about war 
and strategy from combat experience. 
by skipping across a broad spectrum 
of the army’s history, however, ricks 
ignores two other factors in the de-
cline in the army’s generalship: the 
constraints that the post–World War 
II reforms in personnel policies cre-
ated and still impose on the american 
military and the impact of the choices 
that political and military leaders 
inevitably make in the running of a 
complex organization. What was clear 
to those who had served in the interwar 
military was that the system of promo-
tion then had not only been unfair but 
rewarded the slow, the plodding, and 
the stupid. Moreover, as Marshall’s firing 
of so many officers at the war’s outset 
underlined, the system had kept large 
numbers of officers on active duty who 
were too old or incompetent to serve 
in the harsh conditions of wartime.
the result was a major reform of the 
personnel system in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. the “up or out” system, 
modeled on the industrial practices 
of the time, largely frames the present 
practice. that system also aimed at keep-
ing more officers at the middle levels 
than needed, to address the problems 
that a massive mobilization in a major 
world war with the soviet Union would 
require. the up-or-out part of the equa-
tion aimed at ensuring that the system 
would prevent the stagnation that had 
marked the interwar army and forced 
Marshall to fire so many superannuated 
officers. Moreover, the new personnel 
system, with its financial inducements 
encouraging majors, lieutenant colonels, 
and colonels to retire in their middle 
and early forties, fit the health profiles 
of the time. this, after all, was a period 
when officers smoked like chimneys 
and drank like fish. It certainly fit 
the model that american businesses 
had established for their executives, 
a model that came close to destroy-
ing the competitiveness of american 
industry in the 1970s. Most american 
industries have changed their personnel 
systems, forcing out those who fail to 
comply. the american military has not. 
the unintended consequences of this 
system now plague the U.s. military. 
above all, the twenty-year up-or-out 
system has created minimal flexibility 
for the broader education of the officer 
corps. Moreover, it encourages signifi-
cant numbers of outstanding officers 
to retire at precisely the point when 
they could offer much to their services. 
the retirement policies have resulted 
in a brain drain that encourages many 
of the brightest and most competent 
to leave as early as they can to begin 
their second careers. simply put, no 
competent business would allow the 
loss of talent that now takes place every 
year, as exceptional officers retire in 
their midforties. the bottom line has 
been a culture of few risk takers and 
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too many conformists. therefore, the 
future Petraeuses of the army, who 
have pursued efforts to broaden their 
knowledge of military and strategic 
history, have found themselves regarded 
by many of their colleagues as outliers. 
they are to all intents and purposes the 
exceptions to the rule, while too many 
others like tommy franks and ricardo 
sanchez have followed the system of 
lockstep promotion and assignment. 
the army’s present culture (much like 
that of the german army, which lost two 
world wars because the brilliance of its 
tactics could not overcome its contempt 
for strategy and politics) should have 
been the centerpiece on which ricks 
hung his argument. In particular, the 
failure of fort leavenworth and Carlisle 
barracks to provide the educational 
underpinnings of army culture rep-
resents the heart of where it has gone 
wrong. of all the military institutions, 
the army most requires the steady hand 
of professional military education. 
Unfortunately, since 1945 the army has 
been the service least served by that 
crucial enabler of military culture. even 
after the vietnam War underlined the 
flaws in the PMe system, education 
received too little attention from those 
in charge. at times their interference 
was pernicious, as ricks quite correctly 
points out in his discussion of the con-
flict between Jack Cushman and William 
dePuy. the mantra of the army War 
College (at least when this reviewer was 
familiar with it) was that the institution 
existed to give officers rests in their busy 
careers. a former dean of the college 
was even quoted as “preferring that his 
officers spend their time on the golf 
course rather than in the library.” Most 
of the attending officers got the message, 
although a few, like the future Marine 
general Paul van riper, simply went off 
to the Military History Institute and read 
books. today, one of the great ironies in 
the army’s PMe system is the fact that 
there is intense competition among the 
most outstanding army officers to at-
tend the junior or senior course at New-
port and avoid fort leavenworth and 
Carlisle barracks. adding to the irony 
is that the Navy itself has over the past 
forty years made every effort to avoid 
sending its best officers to Newport, or 
to any other PMe institution, despite 
the fact that the Naval War College has 
provided far and away the most intellec-
tually challenging education in strategy.
In examining what has happened to the 
army, it is not sufficient to hop, as ricks 
does, from one decade to another to 
examine this or that general, who may 
or may not reflect the dominant cultural 
mores of a huge organization. following 
vietnam, the pressing problem was to 
reconstitute and reinvigorate a military 
organization that was on its last legs. It 
is not surprising, then, that the army’s 
leadership would concentrate on getting 
the tactics right; operations and strategy 
could come later. Here the two most im-
portant figures in rehabilitating the ar-
my’s leadership were Creighton abrams 
and his successor, frederick C. Weyand, 
who played crucial roles in pushing 
forward that extraordinary group of 
generals who emerged to put the army 
right in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
dePuy was only one of these gener-
als, and while ricks is right to credit 
him with considerable influence (good 
and bad) over the reborn army of the 
1980s, he virtually ignores other equally 
important figures. to understand the 
intellectual and cultural revolution of 
the 1970s at the army’s higher levels, 
we must look at the contributions of 
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generals like don starry, Paul gorman, 
glen otis, and William richardson.
astonishingly, ricks mentions general 
“shy” Meyer, the brilliant army chief 
of staff during the late seventies and 
early eighties, only in passing, quoting 
his famous comment about the “hol-
low army.” yet Meyer, with the help 
of the likes of starry, richardson, and 
otis, was clearly aiming at creating a 
fundamental shift in the army’s culture. 
asking why he failed and why general 
al gray of the Marine Corps succeeded 
would make for a fascinating exami-
nation of the difficulties and pitfalls 
involved in changing organizational 
culture. It also would have allowed ricks 
to get at the heart of the problem. 
Instead, ricks jumps from his discussion 
of dePuy to a discussion of the general-
ship of Norman schwarzkopf and Colin 
Powell, omitting the important story 
of the intellectual retrenchment of the 
intervening years, when dePuy, Meyer, 
starry, and richardson disappeared, to 
be replaced by lesser figures. In that tale 
lies the real cause of whatever decline 
has taken place. as one senior officer 
commented to this reviewer, changing 
the culture of military organizations 
“is like attempting to turn an aircraft 
carrier or ocean liner.” but if profes-
sional military education is not going to 
determine a common culture of excel-
lence, then individual choices are going 
to be the major determinants. therefore, 
in understanding the army’s story, one 
also must pay attention to the role that 
accident, chance, or miscalculation by 
its political masters has played in the 
evolution of what appears to be a decline 
in the effectiveness of its leadership. 
schwarzkopf was probably least typical 
of the army generals of his genera-
tion. rumors ran in Washington that 
he had been shipped out to Central 
Command, at the time a relatively 
unimportant theater in the military 
pecking order, largely to move him out 
of the army staff, where his explosive 
personality had earned him a reputa-
tion for causing turmoil. In other words, 
it was chance and an underestimation 
of how rapidly the world was chang-
ing that led him to fame and fortune. 
It was during the 1990s that flawed po-
litical choices had the greatest impact on 
the culture of the army’s leadership. It 
is not that tommy franks appeared mys-
teriously or as the result of a straight-line 
collapse in the culture of the general-
officer corps. In discussing the causes 
of the vietnam disaster, ricks rightly 
highlights the dysfunctional relation-
ship between lyndon Johnson and his 
military advisers—a flawed relation-
ship exacerbated by the dishonesty of 
secretary of defense robert McNamara 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of staff, general Maxwell taylor. In 
President William Clinton’s administra-
tion, civil-military relations were equally 
dysfunctional, and for similar reasons. 
Here the president, for reasons that 
remain opaque, appears to have aimed 
at appointing senior service command-
ers who were extraordinarily weak. 
the army got the worst of the deal. 
general dennis reimer may have been 
the weakest of Clinton’s appointments. 
Undoubtedly a well-meaning officer, 
reimer nonetheless made decisions that 
now have, and will continue to have, a 
baleful impact on the army’s culture. 
simply put, he wrecked fort leaven-
worth by decreeing that all majors would 
attend the Command and staff College, 
and that there would be no board selec-
tion for officers to attend the college. 
the result was a drastic downgrading 
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of quality of faculty, students, and 
instruction. reimer then proceeded 
to appoint a family friend, general 
John abrams, a skilled soldier with a 
dominating personality that brooked 
no argument, to the army’s intellectual 
heart, the training and doctrine Com-
mand (tradoC). the other choice 
was lieutenant general don Holder, an 
intellectual soldier who would have been 
an ideal individual to hold that position, 
but reimer had been an aide to Creigh-
ton abrams and thus appointed his 
son to the critical tradoC position. 
there the younger abrams created an 
atmosphere of fear and distrust among 
his subordinates—hardly what the army 
needed when preparing to address the 
challenges of the twenty-first century.
In his epilogue, ricks provides some 
suggestions for fixing the army’s 
problems. Unfortunately, they have 
not been thought through and for the 
most part are not realistic or of much 
use in addressing systemic issues. at 
best they are pablum. after all, even 
if army leaders were interested in 
change (and many are), what could 
they possibly do? of what use are such 
statements as “In assessing the stra-
tegic situation today, Marshall might 
conclude that having adaptive, flexible 
military leaders who also are energetic, 
determined, cooperative, and trustwor-
thy is probably more important now 
than at any time since he was chief of 
staff ”? the devil is in the details, and 
ricks has provided no solution as to 
how the army might create general 
officers with those characteristics. 
as for giving generals second and third 
chances, that suggestion would lead to 
even greater mediocrity. It would be any-
thing other than the hard-charging and 
competent who would get the second 
chances. as this reviewer’s colleague and 
friend Colonel richard sinnreich has 
pointed out, “Could flag officer quality 
be improved by institutional changes? 
No doubt it could. but those changes 
would require more than just better 
PMe. they would require a willingness 
to identify, select, and groom potential 
senior leaders in ways to which ameri-
can society in general, and politicians in 
particular, have proved utterly hostile. 
Could we fire generals more readily? 
sure, but that’s a damn hard way to 
improve quality. Moreover, the Navy al-
ready is under growing fire for excessive 
command reliefs. the real challenge isn’t 
to fire more [generals], as ricks would 
have it, but rather promote fewer with 
much more discrimination. thorough 
examinations, 360-degree efficiency 
ratings, graded exercise performance—
there are a host of tools available to 
winnow future leaders. firing gener-
als is as much a confession of system 
failures as of individual failure, and even 
when necessary imposes huge costs.”
In fact, real change would require sys-
temic alteration in the army’s culture, 
which would then require breaking 
many rice bowls and discarding many 
pet rocks. It would aim at change over 
decades rather than over the short term. 
It would require massive changes in the 
educational approaches at fort leav-
enworth and Carlisle barracks. In this 
regard, the current army leadership is 
taking a step in the right direction by 
board-selecting officers to attend fort 
leavenworth. It would mean making 
intellectual performance at PMe institu-
tions play a major role in promotions 
and assignments. this means that those 
institutions would have to force their 
students to study the profession of arms 
and the crucial issues they will have to 
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deal with—war, strategy, and military 
operations. It would also make perfor-
mance at staff and war colleges play a 
major role in selection for command po-
sitions. above all, it would mean drastic 
changes in the army’s personnel system, 
and to the personnel systems of the oth-
er services as well. Had ricks been will-
ing to wrestle with these issues, he would 
have written a very different book. 
Perhaps the most depressing aspect of 
the landscape of the current american 
military has been the return to a moral 
calculus that is nothing short of a return 
to the sexual standards of the victorian 
age. over the past several months we 
have seen the president of the United 
states remove a highly respected retired 
general, to whom the country owes 
much for his having turned around the 
situation in Iraq, from the director-
ship of the CIa for having an affair. 
at the same time the generals who 
botched up the war in Iraq were, as 
ricks notes in a number of cases, not 
fired. Moreover, in one case, in a sad 
repetition of Westmoreland’s promo-
tion to become the army’s chief of staff 
after his disastrous tenure in vietnam, a 
general whose performance was hardly 
more impressive was removed from 
command in Iraq and promoted to the 
position of the army’s chief of staff. 
at present, it would seem that media 
and politicians would prefer standards 
for military leaders that emphasize 
“moral” behavior rather than compe-
tence in the profession—standards that 
few have followed. In a world where 
competence in any profession is an 
extraordinarily rare commodity, and 
especially competence in the military, 
this is indeed a dangerous precedent. 
the message emanating from Washing-
ton would appear to be that our leaders 
prefer military leaders who are simon-
pure (at least in their sexual mores) to 
competent generals and admirals. In 
the end, those at the sharp end will pay 
a terrible price for such imbecility. 
WIllIaMsoN MUrray
naval war college
gaddis, John lewis. george F. Kennan: an ameri-
can life. New york: Penguin, 2011. 784pp. $39.95 
Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for biog-
raphy in 2012, as well as a number of 
other awards, John lewis gaddis’s study 
of george f. Kennan (1904–2005) has 
already firmly established itself as the 
fundamental scholarly biography for the 
Cold War period in american history. 
gaddis began work on this biography in 
1981, not long after he had spent a two-
year period as visiting professor of strat-
egy and policy at the Naval War College. 
at Newport in those days, he was 
already admired for his first book, The 
United States and the origins of the cold 
war, 1941–1947 (Columbia Univ. Press, 
1972), and for the exemplary quality of 
his teaching, which won him a depart-
ment of the Navy Meritorious Civilian 
service award at the Naval War College. 
It was his first book and subsequent 
articles that brought gaddis to Kennan’s 
attention and led him to choose gaddis 
as his authorized biographer. In giving 
gaddis unrestricted access to what 
would eventually become 330 boxes of 
Kennan’s diaries and papers at Princeton 
University’s seeley g. Mudd Manuscript 
library, as well as giving him regular 
interviews, Kennan stipulated that 
the biography would not be published 
during his lifetime and so ensured that 
it would be a long-maturing project. 
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